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Economic measures of income have ignored large areas of human well-being 
and are poor measures of well-being in the areas to which they attend. Despite 
increased recognition of those distortions, ‘GNP per capita continues to be regarded as 
the quintessential indicator of a country’s living standard’ (Partha Dasgupta). Well-
being seems to have intuitive plausibility as a concept, but in practice we encounter a 
bewilderingly diverse family of concepts and approaches, partly reflecting different 
contexts, purposes, and foci of attention. Is there a unifying framework that yet 
respects the complexity and diversity of well-being? This paper presents an imperfect 
comparative and integrative framework, that builds on the contributions by Sen and 
others.
a We move toward the framework gradually, since well-being concepts are 
complex conceptions which reflect pictures of personhood and of science. Insight 
grows through surveying a wide range of relevant experience and views, before 
risking blinkering one's vision in a framework. The paper then uses the framework to 
examine conceptualizations of human well-being, by Dasgupta, Sen, Nussbaum, 
Doyal & Gough, and Alkire. 
                                                 
a A revised version of a paper presented at a workshop on Measuring Well-Being, at WIDER, Helsinki, 
in May 2003, and at seminars in Trivandrum and Pavia. My thanks to workshop participants and to 
Achin Chakraborty, David Clark and Irene van Staveren for their comments, and especially to 
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What should well-being measurers try to measure? To address this question 
we must consider the nature of well-being, and the various purposes of the exercise of 
conceptualizing and measuring. This paper looks mostly at the nature of well-being, 
especially in earlier sections, but purposes will be discussed too, especially in the later 
sections. 
Economics practitioners and their clients have for a long time been poorly 
served by economic theorists in the conceptualization of human well-being. The result 
has been measurement without theory, the distortion of well-being measurement by 
the presence since the 1940s of national accounts and related data, even though 
economic measures of income have ignored large areas of well-being and are poor 
measures of well-being in the areas to which they attend. Increasing recognition of 
those distortions has had relatively little practical impact: ‘GNP per capita continues 
to be regarded as the quintessential indicator of a country’s living standard’ (Dasgupta 
2001: 53). One reason is that alternative measurement should be guided, indeed 
inspired, by a unifying alternative vision yet respect the complexity and diversity of 
well-being; hence the increasing interest now in, for example, Sen’s or Nussbaum’s 
approach. 
This paper stresses the diversity in both well-being and the approaches to it. We 
will move towards a framework gradually, since, as Griffin (1986) argues, well-being 
concepts come as parts of complex conceptualizations which reflect pictures of 
personhood and of science. Insight grows through first surveying the terrain of well-
being, as in Section 1, and some of the range of concepts and conceptualizations, as in 
section 2, before risking blinkering one’s vision in a framework. Section 3 then presents 
an imperfect comparative and integrative framework. Section 4 uses the framework to 
examine some current re-conceptualizations of human well-being, by Dasgupta, Sen, 
Nussbaum, Doyal & Gough and Alkire, and to compare their purposes. Section 5 offers 
some conclusions. 
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2  THE NATURE OF WELL-BEING: TERMS, FOCI AND BLIND-SPOTS 
Literature on ‘well-being’ is massive and diverse. A large part nowadays 
consists of books of advice on how to feel fine, through diet, exotic substances and 
aromas, music, posture techniques, exercise routines, giving more priority to one’s 
family and other personal relationships, or religion. The in-term is well-being, not 
happiness. Perhaps the Aristotelian standpoint is widely shared: that well-being is not 
merely a sensation of happiness. Human beings have more faculties than just feeling 
happiness, pleasure or pain; notably they are creatures of reasoning and of meaning-
making, of imagination, and of intra- and inter-societal links and identities. 
A smaller part of contemporary publication on well-being comes from 
academic philosophy, as in the work of James Griffin or Wayne Sumner, which 
examines a limited set of concepts with reference to a rather limited range of evidence 
and methods. One encounters few real people or cases and usually little behavioural 
science there. Their theories of the good have a narrow basis; ‘work’ does not figure 
in the indexes to Griffin and Sumner’s books. Such analysis does still probe and query 
assumptions behind the treatment of ‘welfare’, personal and social, in modern 
economics. 
A third body of investigation consciously on well-being is the huge literature 
from other social sciences, especially psychology. These use a broader range of 
evidence and concepts. Whereas the ‘ordinal revolution’ in economics rejected 
cardinal measurement of utility and interpersonal utility comparisons, the other social 
science that matches it in scale, psychology, retained the study and measurement of 
subjective well-being (SWB). It shows that SWB is measurable, often relatively little 
related to consumption levels, and not simply imputable from choices – people do not 
try to maximize their own utility and/or are not very good at it (Kiron 1997; 
Kahneman 1994). Only exceptional cases in economics, such as Tibor Scitovsky’s 
remarkable The Joyless Economy, have delved into these sources, until very recently. 
SWB work has long been available, and has grown greatly in the past generation, as in 
the so-called positive psychology movement (e.g. Seligman & Csikszentihalyi, 2000). 
‘Positive’ refers here to the study of success, as Abraham Maslow stressed from the 
1930s: study of mentally healthy people and high achievers, not only the sick and 
disturbed. What outsiders may call SWB research includes arguably at least two 
different streams, the hedonic and the eudaimonic, the latter of which may call itself 
well-being (WB) research or psychological WB research rather than SWB research 
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(Ryan and Deci 2001). Also partly distinct are the great streams of research on 
Quality of Life (QOL) and social indicators, often from sociology, health sciences and 
related areas.
1
Another philosophical style reflects less on generalized impersonal social 
science sources, and more, as done in the Aristotelian or existentialist traditions, on 
insights from history, fiction, drama, biography and the narrative study of lives; for 
example as in Theodore Zeldin’s An Intimate History of Humanity or Andre Comte-
Sponville’s  A Short Treatise on The Great Virtues. Martha Nussbaum’s The 
Intelligence of the Emotions combines this tradition with intensive evidence from 
behavioural  sciences.  A look across this variety of literatures generates many 
considerations, some of which we should mention here. We need to look at quantity 
as well as quality of life, at time budgets, and at the quality of death; and to 
acknowledge that ‘well-being’ refers to many different things. 
The term ‘well-being’ is ambiguous: it has many usages, meanings, 
conceptions. The category well-being seems to be used to refer to whatever is assessed 
in an evaluation of a person’s situation, or, more fittingly and narrowly, in any such 
evaluation which is focused on the person’s ‘being’ (Gasper 2002). The term ‘welfare’ 
can mean how well people live, or what is done by others to help the needy; these are 
the two OED meanings. In the former usage, ‘welfare’ is typically treated 
interchangeably with WB; the OED defines it as ‘well-being; happiness; health and 
prosperity’.
2
The concept of well-being is thus best seen as an abstraction, that is used to 
refer to any of many well-evaluated aspects of life (Travers & Richardson 1993). But 
it has often been reified as a single entity, especially in most utilitarianism and 
utilitarian-influenced economics. Most utilitarianism reduced well-being to well-
feeling (typically seen as pleasure), and further reduced well-feeling to a scalar 
                                                 
1 We will see ‘Quality of Life’ referred to as concerning 1. self-report indicators or 2. non-self-report 
indicators or 3. both; and as identical to well-being (van Praag & Frijters; Dasgupta) or explicitly dis-
tinguished from it (Sen). Standardization of terms appears to be lacking. 
2 In the well-being literatures we encounter various usages of ‘welfare’ besides (1) the same as well-
being, including narrower meanings like (2) the valuation by a person of their own situation (Dasgupta 
2001), and (3) ‘the evaluation assigned by the individual to income or, more generally, to the 
contribution to his well-being from those goods and services that he can buy with money’ (van Praag & 
Frijters 1999: 427). 
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(unitary pleasure, ‘utility’).
3 People were presented as simple creatures, with just one 
sort of appreciative system, and with that one system having just one currency—as if 
we could only see and only see shades of one colour. In contrast, even the simpler, 
hedonic stream of SWB research distinguishes three major aspects of well-being 
which vary partly independently of each other: experiences of happiness, experiences 
of unhappiness, and experiences of contentment. A further ambiguity lurked in 
utilitarianism: was utility the psychic pay-off or was it the usefulness or pleasure-
producing quality of the goods? (Bonner 1995). Lionel Robbins et al. claimed 
Pareto’s legacy but conflated his terms that distinguished these two: ophelimity versus 
utility (Cooter & Rappaport 1984). They thus obscured that even if pleasure is hard to 
measure, usefulness is not always so (e.g. we can measure mobility). 
In practice, mainstream economics declared that each person’s utility (as 
ophelimity, this unitary well-feeling; or as preference fulfilment) is well reflected by 
income. Sen (1985) noted that this reduced well-being to being well-off, financially or 
materially; in other words to well-having or having much (cf. Fromm 1978). To test 
this reduction, one must consider how income is used. Some forms of consumption, 
like heavy alcohol intake and compulsive gambling, damage the consumers and those 
close to them. In countries with less margin for luxury expenditure, alcoholism has 
massive impact on families. Janakarajan & Seabright (1999), for example, record the 
escalating alcohol abuse by men in an economically booming settlement in South 
India, and the ‘noticeably less positive’ (p. 341) responses from women than men 
about changes in their family’s situation. 
The Aristotelian tradition takes well-being instead as well-living. People are 
seen as complex – reasoning, social, and thus in part moral – actors, who live in 
groups, for finite lives with an unavoidable rise and fall. In contrast to the abstracted 
utilitarian notion of a person as a smart rat who pulls the levers to maximize the 
reading on his utility meter, well-being is seen as the fulfilment of a deep and various 
nature, not just one particular type of sensation (Segal 1991). The range of important 
goods includes things which are not merely instrumental to our flourishing, as routes 
to our psychic utility, but which rather are ‘constitutive of our flourishing’ (O’Neill 
1993: 24). Culyer (1990: 11) argues that ‘being reassured’ leads to ‘pleasure’; but 
                                                 
3 Easterlin (2001: 206) equates six concepts in one sentence: ‘I use the terms happiness, subjective 
well-being, satisfaction, utility, well-being, and welfare interchangeably’. 
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does it, is there a single mental currency, or is being reassured itself the pay-off ? One 
could distinguish many aspects within well-living; perhaps well-thinking and well-
doing, as emphasised in for example some religious and quasi-religious communities. 
Well-living can become denigrated as an elitist notion. Distanced labels may 
aid calmer debate. Ryan & Deci (2001) call the conception of well-being as happiness 
or pleasure the hedonic conception; versus the eudaimonic conception of well-being 
as well-considered fulfilment. 
Well-living is perhaps a superior term to well-being (at least for eudaimonists). 
‘Well-being’ is such an established term that we will use it too. However, ‘well-living’ 
has claims to be a better label for what most people conceive of as well-being. ‘Well-
living’ is a more active term, and in economics the term ‘well-being’ still carries a 
utilitarian baggage. Thus even for Sen, coming out of the tradition of welfare 
economics, ‘well-being’ refers only to one’s own gratification, and is distinct from the 
pursuit and fulfilment of one’s ideals and commitments. To an Aristotelian this seems a 
strange usage. Max-Neef’s model of human needs illustrates a richer conception, with 
dimensions of Having, Doing, and Interacting, as well as Being, in each of a series of 
life spheres (see e.g. Ekins & Max-Neef 1992, which links this perspective to WB 
measurement). 
Being is a prerequisite for, and central component of, well-being. 
Lethal epidemics amongst the poor can raise average per capita income and other per 
capita indicators. Clearly, a well-being/well-living category should instead in some way 
reflect quantity of life as well as quality of life. The Human Development Index does 
this. The central importance of quantity is revealed in the oft-cited notional choice 
between a life of 70 years with pre-Industrial Revolution living standards in all non-
mortality related aspects and one of 35 (or maybe even 55) years with contemporary 
rich country living standards (at an income level purportedly 100 times higher). The 
poor country dweller would live as a family- and community-member, not in a prison, 
but with few material comforts. Possibly most people would choose the non-opulent life 
of 70 years (which happens to be a reality in a few remote corners of the world). This 
puts opulence sharply into perspective. 
Time-patterns in being/living are of central importance for well-being. 
If we look empirically at quality of living, time-use too is central and little reflected in 
economic measures. Naila Kabeer’s study of women textile-workers in Bangladesh 
found many with 18 hour work days: a factory job preceded and followed by 
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housework, sometimes even as a second job (Kabeer 2000). ‘Housework’ for most 
women includes caring time, often including care for the handicapped, elderly, and sick. 
While, remarkably, the self-assessed well-being of some people handicapped by 
accidents can return to near the previous level, that of their unpaid carers is unlikely to. 
In low-income countries, unmanageable carer time-budgets can affect life-quantity of 
the cared-for; in India few of the mentally retarded survive to adulthood (Harriss-White 
1999: 138-9). 
In apartheid South Africa, many black workers commuted three hours each way 
each day. In contrast to that, firstly, the time required for material reproduction by some 
hunter-gatherer peoples historically has been strikingly low; secondly, commuting time 
in the North, while rarely paid by employers and hence liable to be unmeasured in 
economics, can evolve into a new life sphere of seclusion and self-cultivation: the car 
driver cocooned in his luxury vehicle on the freeway, replete with snacks and music-
system, free from interruptions and duties. And what is one to make of figures of tv 
watching times in the North: four hours daily on average in the USA, with the set often 
switched on for longer (The Economist, 12 April 2002; and 3.5 hours daily in the UK 
for the middle-aged), or of the new mass opium of communing with the muse of 
pornography from the Internet—reportedly the leading use of the most powerful new 
medium? The consensus academic reaction to Robert Nozick’s famous thought-
experiment, the Experience Machine (Nozick 1974), was to assert that people will not 
choose to live cocooned in a world of electronic substitute experience, however high it 
raises their utility meter; yet perhaps many come to live so. 
Concern for well-being and well-living must include central attention to 
people’s work involvements, and domestic involvements, not only their consumption. 
Welfare economics has historically looked very largely at consumption (Goodwin 
1997). For example, economic calculations and national income have ignored the 
unhappiness from involuntary unemployment (Clark & Oswald 1994) and the 
satisfactions (and dissatisfactions) from employment. The pattern found in Voices of the 
Poor and many other studies is however that ordinary people’s lists of priorities include 
both ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ aspects (Alkire 2002: 179-80). There is evidence for 
affluent countries that non-market sources – family, friends, health, recreation – are 
more important in general for happiness than are market sources, and that amongst the 
market sources, experiences during work hours or unemployment are more determinant 
  6 
of personal satisfaction than is the level of income or consumption (Oswald 1997; Lane 
1998a, 1998b). We consider this more fully later. 
External work is a major source of socializing, stimulation, challenge and 
achievement (see e.g. Lane 1991, Parker & Gerard 1990); ‘freed’ from work, some 
lottery winners become miserable. Some of the low-income Bangladeshi women 
workers studied by Kabeer reported that they took their jobs for the non-monetary 
rewards: to avoid boredom and have company. The satisfactions from work are only 
slightly reflected in economic accounting. That applies the perspective of a capitalist to 
a nation, with work assumed to be a cost rather than a benefit. 
Many aspects of well-being pass outside markets, and may be competitive with 
them. 
Travers & Richardson (1993) summarize many findings that there are only weak ob-
served correlations between all of the following: 1. Material well-being (‘well-
having’), 2. Happiness, 3. Health, and 4. Participation in society. Concerning the link 
between material well-being and happiness/SWB, while the rich in all countries have 
higher SWB, there is surprisingly little difference between the SWB levels recorded in 
richer and poorer countries, and especially between middle-income, rich and very rich 
countries. Myers & Diener (1995) report almost no relation between income and hap-
piness over time in the postwar USA, suggesting that richer people enjoy their relative 
superiority rather than their opulence, and/or that expectations grow with opportuni-
ties and new unfulfilled ambitions emerge. Many other studies report similarly (e.g. 
Easterlin 2001). 
Yet some other factors retain a stronger correlation with happiness. Lane (1991, 
1998a) documents that considerably more important than wealth for happiness in 
America are 1. marital satisfaction, 2. self-esteem (and other psychological traits; Myers 
& Diener add: extraversion, optimism), 3. self-management skills, 4. financial stability, 
and 5. leisure. Myers and Diener add to such a list: 1a. other good personal relations, 3a. 
feelings of progress towards goals which one accepts, and 6. religious belief (Camfield 
& Skevington 2003 give a similar recent multi-national survey). Does a preoccupation 
with material opulence compete with these other factors, given the mind-set and time-
use it may bring? Lane and others argue that the competition is serious. 
All this goes against the expectations of the Material Well-Being school 
represented by Marshall and Pigou (Cooter & Rappaport 1984). They expected Material 
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WB to correlate well with, or at least not interfere with, other sources so that they could 
focus on it alone. 
Well-living includes well-becoming and well-dying. 
Even an utilitarian rat, assiduously pulling its pleasure-levers, exists in time. First the 
person must be created, formed, emerge. Interestingly, developmental psychology 
suggests that ‘well-becoming’, personal growth, requires pain.
4 And eventually each 
person must decline, cease, un-be. In grindingly poor mid-20
th century China, the 
Communists gained much respect for their commitment to ensuring decent burials. The 
1990s Voices of the Poor study shows the strong importance attached to funerals in 
most milieux (Narayan et al. 2000: 70). Funerals reflect death as a very special aspect of 
existence, both for those whose lives end and for their associates, not just ‘an external 
limit on existence’, suggests Hodge (p.52); thus they are less for the dead than for the 
living. Inability to cope with death represents an inability to face life. The hospices 
movement is one relevant response. A well-living perspective considers the life-cycles 
of real people, not only the imputed wish-fulfilment of faceless moneyed consumers. It 
must look at Quality of Death as part of the Quality of Life, including in particular the 
quality of decline, fade-out and departure (see e.g. Jennings et al. 2003). Ignoring the 
quality of death brutalizes both the ignored and the ignorers.
5
Given the many relevant aspects of well-being, it seems better to use WB as an 
umbrella term rather than seek for a single key aspect or theme. 
Feeling and thinking, becoming and living and dying, and more, make up being. Well-
being thus has diverse aspects. Rather than set up a precisely delimited, narrow single 
notion of well-being, and then try to police its ‘correct’ usage, we will do better to see 
WB as an umbrella notion. The next section introduces the standard philosophy list of 
interpretations of well-being, only now that we have established this point. 
A danger arises of disappearing as a result under an avalanche of indicators. 
Hodge argues that we must not isolate indicators from meanings and life-purposes in 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Ajeet Mathur for this observation and for the term ‘well-becoming’. 
5 Models for health policy analysis based on economics focus on the QALY returns from health 
expenditures; they look only to the future of the care-receiver, not also to the carers and survivors, or 
the meanings and obligations shared between the actors. The work of hospices might fail such an 
evaluation. Similarly, ‘“distributive models” of health care justice cannot supply a rationale for 
expanded access to hospice care. These models fail because they are based on… [a] picture of the 
moral agent, who resembles few of us as we lie dying…’ (Nelson 2003: S18). Rather than ‘fail’, one 
can say that their picture of living is too narrow – it ignores dying, and an inevitable stage for many old 
people of reduced autonomy. 
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the situation concerned. We still need organizing frameworks. Section 2 goes on to 
the main dichotomy used to organize the field: between subjective and objective 
aspects or interpretations of well-being. Is this dichotomy itself objective?
 
 
3  ATTEMPTS TO THEORIZE AND CATEGORIZE 
3.1  A standard philosophy categorization of conceptions of well-being, and 
additions 
A categorization of conceptions of well-being by Derek Parfit (1984) has 
become widely used in philosophical ethics (see e.g. Griffin 1986, Crisp 2001). It 
contains both so-called subjective and objective conceptions. All make plausible 
claims. 
(1)  Hedonism, well-being seen as pleasure. Hedonism fails as a full concept of 
well-being, due to both the diversity of our types of felt concern and the nature 
of some of the factors which strongly influence pleasure. It is only one part of 
(1*) a family of conceptions of well-being as satisfaction or SWB. They all 
remain vulnerable to the significance of ‘framing’ and adaptive response, 
which we consider further later in this section. A severely retarded person 
might feel fine; likewise someone whose brain and nervous system have been 
damaged by drugs. 
(2)  Desire theories: well-being seen as preference/desire fulfilment. One origin of 
this conception is in economists’ operationalization of the previous 
conception, well-being as pleasure or satisfaction. From the days before 
systematic SWB research this has been done by the assumption that preference 
fulfilment always or nearly always brings satisfaction.
6 In the attempt to in 
turn operationalize this second conception without even measuring preference 
fulfilment either, the stream evolved into (2*) ‘revealed preference theory’, 
which imputes preference fulfilment from the fact of choice. That choices 
reveal preferences became taken as a tautology. So well-being was reduced to 
choice. Ironically, this was often done in a veiled way, such that many 
economists   and  their   students   and   clients   remained   unclear   about  the 
                                                 
6 Conflation was eased by a linguistic trick: fulfilment of preferences was often described as 
‘satisfaction of desires’, which could too easily be identified with ‘satisfaction’. care. 
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methodological and value choices which were made. It in effect merged the 
preference fulfilment stream into instead a libertarian stream which insists on 
people’s right to make their own mistakes: to pursue their own goals, 
regardless of whether they are likely to fulfil them and of what that would 
bring. The libertarian stream is not highlighted in Parfit’s list; arguably it is 
not even a conception of well-being. Next, theories of well-being as desire 
fulfilment or desire pursuit are vulnerable, like hedonism, to the existence of 
perverted desires and of addictions like alcoholism (see e.g. Scanlon 1993; 
Sagoff 1994). So the more plausible versions (2**) are formulated in terms of 
fully informed desires—which would have to be fully informed from birth in 
order to rule out all addictions. These versions are insufficient too (as well as 
hard to convert into well-being measures): people with perverse desires to 
damage others may not be put off by full information on how to avoid damage 
to themselves or about the harm they can bring others; nor would be any 
people who are inclined to damage themselves. Why would one consider such 
people’s desires objectionable? In effect by claiming that there exists some 
‘objective list’ of criteria, which is not identical to people’s desires and 
excludes some types of desire pursuit and fulfilment. 
(3)  Objective list theories. The term ‘objective’ can be misleading, as we see later; 
Scanlon (1993) offered the better title of ‘substantive good conceptions’. Each 
such theory has a listing of (the) elements that make a life well lived; as for 
example in theories in the eudaimonic tradition, such as Nussbaum’s. In a 
sense, satisfaction- and desire- theories are objective list theories which have 
just one element on their list. Crisp notes that while objective list theories of 
the good are elitist in one sense – based on tested knowledge rather than on 
desires or pleasures alone – they need not entail a Big Brother state. They may 
be combined with theories of the right which establish areas for individual 
self-determination.
7 How a ‘substantive list’ is derived varies greatly. The 
following ideal types exist, amongst which mixtures are possible. (3a) Some 
lists  are  direct  stipulations,  drawn  from  intuition,  religion or tradition. (3b) 
                                                 
7 Further, more complex pictures of WB such as Nussbaum’s can perhaps incorporate rights and 
liberties, because they go beyond the crude picture of personhood that underpins a theory of the good 
that has no reference to those aspects. 
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Others are derived through formal analytical procedures, as we see later with 
Doyal & Gough’s theory of need. That proffers objectively implied needs, 
derived from and conditional on some (not purely objective) more general 
specification of the good. And (3c) some lists are derived through consultation 
and perhaps debate within a particular political community. Nussbaum’s list 
has aspects of all these types: it derives from the use of formal criteria 
combined with ethical intuitions, and is to be elaborated and operationalized in 
each political context. 
So, to accommodate current theories of well-being, Parfit’s categorization should be 
extended. Let us underline and supplement the additional variants already mentioned. 
(1*)  Hedonism uses a language of pleasure, but is just one member of a family of 
related but significantly distinct theories. In other members there are many 
types of utility, pleasure or satisfaction, not all of them reliably or meaning-
fully traded-off against each other. 
(4)  The libertarian stance, wherein one’s good means one’s choice. This may be 
qualified by requirements of not harming others, but such requirements are not 
as part of the conception of one’s own well-being. 
(5)  Sen uses a conception of informed, rational preferences for functionings and 
‘capabilities’, the latter meaning access to particular valued functionings. This 
is in contrast to desire theories, which use the language of pure preference and 
apply it to alternative goods baskets. Capability is perhaps better seen as a cri-
terion for personal advantage as opposed to well-being, we argue later. The 
theory might be classified as an objective list theory, but of a peculiar type, 
since Sen insists, at least formally, on not specifying what would or should be 
the outcome of informed and rational preference. To call it a desire theory is 
also unsatisfactory: it stresses public discussion and informed public decision 
for some priorities, rather than monetizable calculations based only on indi-
viduals’ desires for themselves. 
In contrast, Nussbaum (3*) specifies a series of functionings to which, she argues, all 
persons should have access. But like Sen, she does not seek to enforce use of the access 
(except for the schooling of children, control of infectious diseases, and such like). 
Within objective list theories we should thus distinguish those which assess 
well-being only or mainly by access, from those which look primarily at achievement 
of valued functionings. The latter is the approach to well-being in much (Physical) 
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Quality of Life and social indicators research, with the values specified in some 
general (and thus ‘objective’, public) form rather than only by individual desire. 
With Nussbaum and Quality-of-Life research we return to the richness and 
realism of discussion of well-being which we encountered earlier, from a wider range 
of literatures than the analytic philosophy tradition to which Parfit’s list belongs. A 
considerable gulf has existed between most work in this tradition and substantive 
research on the content of well-being.
8
Scanlon (1993) compares WB theories according to their relevance for 
different decision-makers: for oneself; for a policy-maker acting in relation to others; 
and for moral argument. He proposes that desire theories (#2) are only relevant in the 
political context, where political leaders may conclude to not interfere with many 
pernicious and damaging desires. In contrast, he argues, for moral argumentation we 
are led inexorably to a substantive good conception (#3). One might add that the 
informed desire (#2**) conception seems more at home for the notional case of the 
individual choosing purely for him/her-self, and that the capability criterion appears 
more relevant to public decision-making about persons’ advantage. 
Kagan (1994) contextualizes the conceptions in a different, complementary 
way. He underlines that they describe different things. For him, (personal) well-being 
refers to feelings in a person’s body and mind, in other words to well-feeling; and he 
adopts a common usage of ‘Quality of Life’, to refer instead to various availabilities 
and non-feeling functionings: in other words, (other aspects of) well-living. Many 
other authors employ a language of ‘subjective versus objective’ indicators of well-
being. 
 
3.2  The language of ‘subjective versus objective’ measures of WB is misused 
Economists often use a single contrast between ‘subjective and objective 
indicators of welfare’. This tends to oversimplify. It misleads when combined with 
two tendentious assumptions: that WB is unitary and that the class of indicators 
derived without the judgement of the subject have an epistemological privilege. We 
should instead use two more cautious contrasts. 
                                                 
8 Richard Brandt was one notable exception; he enriched his theory of the good by considerable 
attention to evidence from psychology (Brandt 1979). 
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(1)  Measures of subjective WB (SWB) versus measures of objective WB (OWB); 
in other words, measures of feelings versus measures of non-feeling aspects 
such as longevity. As the mass of non-economics literatures note, we have 
here measures of different (families of) things, not different measures of a 
single thing. 
(2)  Self-report versus non self-report (subject-independent) measures of WB 
(Diener’s terms; Camfield & Skevington 2003). Self-report can cover more 
than feelings of (dis)satisfaction; subjects can use other modes and criteria of 
judgement. 
Some people propose (opposite to Kagan) that we reserve the term QOL for 
self-report judgements, perhaps on the grounds that quality of life is about the nature 
of perceived or felt experience. Yet the QOL term has been so long and diversely used 
that it may be beyond purification through stipulation; and further, life involves also 
the unperceived, the unconscious, and the unfelt. 
Figure 1 then distinguishes four types of indicator.
9 Such a table adds non-self-
report measures of subjective well-being (the top right quadrant) to the three 
categories which Camfield & Skevington (2003) use. I have used their titles in quote 
marks, while the examples are mine; in similar vein one could label the top-right 
quadrant ‘objective indicators of perceptions’. 
 
FIGURE 1 






Measures of subjective WB 
‘Self-report subjective’ 
(e.g.: ‘I am very satisfied 
with how far I can walk’) 
E.g. monitoring of types of brain function 
and physiological indicator that express 
SWB 
Measures of objective WB  ‘Self-report objective’ (e.g.:  
‘I can walk 100 metres’) 
‘Objective’ – observing how far people 
really (can) walk, etc. 
 
We need at least one more distinction: (3) between measures which are 
applied to all times and places (‘universalist’), and measures chosen per time and 
place (‘relativist’). If  we look  at  it  closely we  may  find  a continuum  rather than a 
                                                 
9 Veenhoven (2003) gives a more refined, 3x3, classification, which distinguishes also an intermediate 
option in each of the dimensions. 
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dichotomy, but this continuum is worth at least one distinction rather than none. One 
source of the popularity of the GNP per capita measure for measuring human well-
being, a task for which it was not devised and is fundamentally unsuited, has been its 
combination of two appeals, as a universal and ‘objective’ measure which yet in 
principle is derived from consumer’s subjective wishes. But it only refers to wishes 
that achieve expression in market terms. Things only enter GNP calculations in 
proportion to how much people are willing and able to pay for them. 
Shaffer (1996) makes a composite contrast, between economists’ Income/ 
Consumption approach and the alternative Participatory approach to the study of 
poverty. In the Income/Consumption Approach well-being/poverty is determined by 
an external expert who, typically by use of a questionnaire survey, measures degrees 
of basic needs fulfilment/deprivation, by reference to the proxies of income and/or 
consumption of goods and services. He usually takes no critical stance towards 
consumer preferences, seeing his work and role as descriptive. 
In the Participatory Approach well-being/poverty is investigated by interactive 
internal and external discussion and participation in assessment, to look at multiple 
aspects of deprivation, employing multiple criteria and a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. There is a critical dialogue about current preferences, and the 
objective is to contribute to both understanding and empowerment of the people 
whose situation is studied. Chambers and others have influentially collected and 
disseminated examples of local people's own criteria of well-being and ill-being (see 
e.g. HDR 1997, p. 17). 
Social exclusion theory gives a third perspective on poverty/well-being. It 
looks at the nature of a person’s social relationships with others; and at illicit 
discrimination (e.g. on grounds of caste or gender) and unequal access to benefits 
which are supposed to be available to everyone.
10 It uses a norm of citizenship and 
estimates its prerequisites; different conceptions of citizenship lead to different 
interpretations of social exclusion (Gore 1996). Further, social exclusion can be 
assessed in a participatory or a subject-independent way. 
Shaffer outlines how such approaches in poverty studies reflect different ways 
of looking at life, each of which may have strengths and weaknesses. The 
                                                 
10 It already contains explicitly two specifications: one for full participation in one’s society, and one 
for liberation, which requires critical autonomy in addition to autonomy of agency. 
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Participatory Approach and social exclusion approach use more complex pictures of 
persons and of human lives than does the Income/Consumption approach. The 
approaches also use different philosophies of knowledge and different ethics. They 
will not therefore easily displace each other. Each has its own audience (cf. Dean 
2003). 
 
3.3  We must consider both SWB and OWB 
Measures of SWB can be valid and reliable: they can acceptably measure 
certain perceptions (Myers & Diener 1995; Camfield & Skeffington 2003). This 
finding concerns the focus and quality of the measurement, not necessarily the 
stability or good judgement of the perception that is measured. 
First, psychology research shows that SWB is highly conditional on ‘framing 
effects’; for example, conditional on with whom/when/where one compares one’s 
present situation. For example, Frank (1997) notes how strongly in the U.S. the 
satisfaction from consumption depends on how the consumer’s consumption level 
compares to his/her previous consumption level and to the consumption level of her 
reference group. 
Second, adaptive preference (sometimes called ‘response shift’) is widespread, 
notably where one’s preferences and perceptions adjust to one’s situation, however 
good or bad, to reinterpret it as normal and tolerable. Cummins and others hold that 
this adjustment is not merely widespread but normal.
11 Such shifts would strengthen 
the case for subject-independent measures, as Sen, Nussbaum, Sunstein and others 
have argued. 
Thirdly, more generally, one can simply mis-assess one’s situation (Kagan). 
So measures of SWB cannot be identical to those for QOL. This is quite apart from 
the possibility, recognised in tragedy and also by Sen, that one may be committed to 
goals which do not give one SWB. 
It must be stressed however that ‘objective’ measures of WB always reflect a 
set of values – we only measure there what is proposed as of value; objective well-
being is a normative concept. The question is how well-argued and/or widely-
accepted those values are. For example, assessing lives in terms of longevity, 
                                                 
11 David Clark queries this, including from his work in South Africa (e.g. Clark 2003). Elster (1983) 
examines adaptive preferences in detail. 
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morbidity, and the requirements for autonomy of agency gives a value-laden but 
cogent, widely accepted, subject-independent, conception of well-being (cf. Doyal & 
Gough 1991). 
We must not ignore the information in measures of SWB. They tell us about 
something(s) different and important, people’s feelings. If people did not feel, then we 
would be much less likely to feel for and with them and to be motivated to help the 
disadvantaged. And the messages which these measures have brought concerning 
such important variables are massively significant. 
Firstly, even if preferences are often adaptive, the gap that SWB data shows 
between the weak or negligible impact of increases in measured real income and the 
substantial impacts of other promotor factors on SWB in richer countries is one of the 
major findings of modern social science (Easterlin ed. 2002). 
Secondly, while such impact findings are less common (although so is the 
research, notes Easterlin) they sometimes also occur in poorer countries. They should 
lead us to review the measures for income and other ‘objective’ aspects of well-being, 
the values and assumptions hidden in the choice of indicators, and the uses made of 
income. For example, Janakarajan and Seabright compare the changes between 1985 
and 1992 in two areas of Tamil Nadu (India) which had experienced contrasting 
recent economic fortunes. They find no strong and easily explainable correlations 
between the levels of various ‘objective’ welfare indicators and the perceptions of 
change. ‘There is [also] a striking difference between the answers given to questions 
about respondents’ own families and questions about the fortunes of the village as a 
whole. The latter are markedly more positive’ (pp. 339-40), about matters of which 
the respondents probably knew less. Some ‘objective’ measures of improved welfare 
in these villages, notably the shift to supposedly preferred, higher status, foods, may 
instead ‘owe a good deal to social and life style pressures and are not necessarily 
perceived as bringing benefits to the household’ (p. 342). 
Quite different discrepancies can occur, equally significant. N.S. Jodha found 
major divergences between the stagnant figures for real rural incomes in a set of 
North Indian villages, provided by India’s relatively well-respected economic 
statistics bureaucracy, and the declarations by the majority of villagers of improved 
well-being. In this case the gains in SWB were strongly related by the villagers to 
changes in objective but non-monetized aspects of their lives: diversity of diet, ability 
to send children to school, increased access to cheap but life-changing products such 
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as transistor radios, and increased ability to survive without labouring for others, even 
if this meant a fall in monetary income. Such patterns of affect are widespread, not 
specific to a few villages or to India. Here there was no discrepancy between SWB and 
non-income OWB, but a divergence between their trends and those in income. 
 
3.4  Well-Being is a Vector  
Utilities Not Utility, and Life Spheres not only the Market. 
At least three types of fundamental plurality are relevant here. One is well-known in 
economics and sometimes misinterpreted: that there are diverse individuals, not only a 
societal aggregate. The other two have been neglected (despite e.g. Sen 1981): that 
there are various types of mental attitude, not a single ‘utility’, and various spheres of 
life with distinct forms of thought, not only the impersonal utilitarian market. 
The language of ‘weighing up’ conflicting considerations (e.g. Crisp 2001) 
presumes commensurability and aggregation, rather than some other form of choice. 
But psychology confirms what introspection and the arts always suggested: we have 
diverse types of psychic ‘currency’, not only one.
12 Scitovsky (1976/1992), for 
example, considerably deepened the economics of welfare by distinguishing the 
‘currencies’ of comfort and stimulation. Eudaimonic-WB research covers a range of 
emotional, cognitive and existential dimensions. Even the simpler palette of hedonic-
WB research distinguishes positive emotions, negative emotions, and life satisfaction, 
as basic dimensions of subjective well-being (e.g. Myers & Diener 1995: 174, 
‘Positive and negative emotions are only weakly correlated with one another’). 
Different spheres of life can involve different types of thinking and feeling 
(see e.g. Anderson 1993, van Staveren 2001, Walzer 1983). As elucidated by authors 
like Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams and Amartya Sen, these cannot be all subsumed 
by a single type of calculation (see e.g. Gray 1993, Sen & Williams 1982). Alkire 
surveys thirtynine lists, largely similar, of proposed fundamental, irreducible, aspects 
of well-being (2002: 59-85). 
Since the mainstream of economics has derived from a priori and abstracted 
theorization about one type of life situation (the cool, calculating and assiduous choice 
maker in markets) it often has not faced or accepted the vector nature of WB. No 
                                                 
12 The plurality of types of psychic ‘currency’ must not be confused with the plurality of ways of 
‘earning’, even if there were only a single ‘currency’. 
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advance in indicators and indexes will find the one correct index that converts WB or 
poverty to a scalar. Scalar indexes have their uses, but not as all-purpose measures. 
Mainstream economics has generally recognized the third type of plurality 
affecting well-being: plurality of persons. Its longstanding response was perverse: to 
try to avoid interpersonal comparisons, rather than to be conscious about and analyse 
the value choices involved in the comparisons which are inevitable in public life. 
Ironically, we might say that interpersonal comparisons are feasible and legitimate 
except in the market-metric. Interpersonal comparisons of non-utility variables, such 
as holdings of Rawlsian primary goods, are perfectly feasible; and comparisons are 
now standard and well-validated for satisfaction measures too, as we have seen. But 
money-tarianism too readily makes comparisons across persons. We cannot equate a 
Euro more for the rich man with a Euro less for the pauper and declare the 
redistribution societally neutral. Money-tarianism ignores the worth of cataract 
operations and hospices for the poorest, since they cannot afford them. 
‘Poverties Not Poverty’. 
Poverty means the lack of something(s) of special importance. As remarked by the 
Chilean economist and needs-theorist, Manfred Max-Neef (1989), we must speak then 
of poverties not poverty, for different important things may be lacking. As in needs 
theory, what is lacking can be specified as the requisites for survival, or health, or 
dignity, or flourishing, and so on - or as those things themselves.
13 In other words, 
poverty (like development) is a vector not a scalar concept, though we sometimes for 
purposes of making decisions find aggregation useful. 
Poverty concerns not only lack of income and wealth. ‘I am illiterate. I am like 
a blind person’ remarked an illiterate mother in Pakistan (cited by Narayan et al: 53). 
Narayan et al. at first stipulate that ‘While poverty is material in nature, it has 
psychological effects’ (2000: 37); but others call these psychic poverties: having no 
voice, no dignity, being humiliated, feeling powerless, being unable to participate in 
one’s community. These poverties also vary independently of material poverty. And 
the  ability  to  participate  and  to  have  voice  is not mere subjective perception. Any 
                                                 
13 Baulch (1996:38) tries to distinguish poverty, deprivation, and ill-being. For him, poverty means lack 
of the requisites for well-being—a person may have the requisites, and so not be poor, but mis-use 
them and so have low well-being. He takes deprivation to mean feelings of dissatisfaction. 
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claim that poverty is only material in nature is swept away by the end of that chapter 
in Voices of the Poor. While the definitions by poor people vary, Narayan et al. find 
that ‘What is striking, however, is the extent to which dependency, lack of power and 
lack of voice emerge as core elements of poor people’s definitions of poverty’ (p. 64). 
These aspects are not only ‘material in nature’. At least part of the World Bank thus 
acknowledged that ‘Poverty Is Multidimensional’ (Narayan et al. 2000: 32). 
Baulch (1996) suggested that we use a series of poverty concepts, 
progressively more inclusive, rather than attempt to devise a single ‘correct’ concept:  
1. Private Consumption;  2. #1 plus income from Common Property Resources;  3. #2 
plus income from social provision/consumption; 4. # 3 + Assets; 5. #4 + Dignity; 6. 
#5 + Autonomy. To organize these and similar ideas, we next look further at the 
notion of levels, and at the purposes and context of an analysis of well-being. 
 
4  BRIDGING THE MEANS-ENDS DIVIDE: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Poverty can be conceptualized at different levels. Kabeer (1996) contrasts: i) the 
‘means perspective’, which focuses on the resources and requisites which people 
possess or obtain and can use to fulfil their (basic) needs or preferences; these means are 
often (inadequately) summarized by a measure of their income; and ii) the ‘ends 
perspective’, which focuses on the actual degree of fulfilment of their needs or 
preferences. Economists typically adopt the means perspective, though they can also 
consider consumption, which moves us part way to an ‘ends’ perspective. Measures of 
income or personal consumption often neglect non-commoditized goods and services. 
The traditional economics foci and presumptions can be summarized as a 
chain: (exogenous) Preferences and Resource endowments Æ Income Æ Choice/ 
Expenditure Æ Preference fulfilment Æ Satisfaction (utility). Much work, especially 
in psychology, has demonstrated the limits of these presumptions, and for example of 
the model of expected-utility maximization. Consumer expenditure, to take a concrete 
example, is a weak proxy for the quantity and quality of consumption—are purchased 
goods actually used, how long do they last, how useful are they? Sen has built a 
framework for welfare economics which enlighteningly adds levels to the 
conventional set, notably the levels of functionings and capability. Each level can be 
the focus for defining and/or measuring poverty: so we can define ‘income poverty’, 
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‘capability poverty’ and so on. Sen’s categories and the work of Doyal and Gough 
underlie the next two tables. 
Figure 2 presents an elaborated set of levels, grouped into three ranges (inputs, 
intermediate events, and outcomes), and some of the corresponding types of study of 
well-being and/or poverty. The table includes rows for each of the interpretations of 
well-being which we saw in section 2. Some readers might place value fulfilment in 
either the desire fulfilment or functionings row (the latter allocation would match an 
‘objective list’ approach), but it may be worth highlighting separately. 
National income measures concern only range I, the money-metric focus. 
They measure monetized activity. If treated as measures of net benefits they at most 
measure opportunities, not achieved well-being in terms of actual consumption or 
functioning or satisfaction. Even as measures of valued opportunities, they include 
much which should be excluded, exclude much which should be included, and weight 
inequitably whatever is included.
14
Figure 2’s narrative structure, from resources through to felt satisfaction and 
value fulfilment, is still not ideal for a descriptive and explanatory micro-economics. 
Each of the categories contains ambiguities (see e.g. Gasper 2002); this is common 
though in social science. Reality also has loops and alternative narrative sequences, 
not a one-way causal chain; e.g. SWB could feedback into functionings, and 
capabilities feed back into resources. The focus on a chain-narrative brings a danger 
too of neglecting process-values (Hirst 1990). Further, the structure of the table 
should not make us assume that the level or levels which has normative priority must 
be the final one. The set of levels still serves to usefully organize and compare diverse 
literatures; and it highlights the intermediate range of categories (set II in figure 2) 
between economists’ two traditional foci, the monetizable inputs to life and, 
secondarily, the presumed psychic outputs expressed in the mental money of utility. 
Economists have studied the inputs empirically and imputed the psychic outputs from 
those inputs. 
                                                 
14 In the first of these categories, many things which typically reflect lack or loss of well-being are 
treated as benefits, such as most commuter travel and ‘defensive expenditures’ which merely 
counteract costs caused by economic growth, like environmental pollution or increased stress and 
conflict. These expenditures grow far faster than overall GDP in rich countries (Ekins & Max-Neef eds. 
1992: 254). Net economic performance can be conventionally recorded as improving while net societal 
performance declines (see e.g. Daly & Cobb 1994). 
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FIGURE 2 
Alternative levels of focus in studies of well-being 
PUTATIVE NARRATIVE SEQUENCE 
(from bottom to top) 
WHO HAS STUDIED THE CATEGORY? 
III. FULFILMENT / SATISFACTION INFORMATION 
HUMAN FULFILMENT 
as value fulfilment 
Studied by humanistic psychologists and 
philosophers  
Utility – as SATISFACTION  
(this is not necessarily a unitary category; 
different aspects can be distinguished) 
Traditionally not measured by economics (instead 
presumed unitary and imputed via long chains of 
assumptions). Studied empirically in psychology, 
especially in SWB research, and by others. 
‘Utility’ – as DESIRE FULFILMENT 
Imputed from choice, in much economics; i.e. 
(choice Æ desire fulfilment) is presumed. Studied 
directly by some others. 
II. NON-FULFILMENT NON-MONEY-METRIC INFORMATION 
FUNCTIONINGS 
(other than satisfaction) 
Little studied by economics (health economics 
may be one exception). Studied by functional 
specialisms, sociology, social statistics, 




(the range of lives which people could attain) 
Hard to measure; often functionings are taken as 
the proxy. But see e.g. medical measures of 
(dis)ability. 
S-CAPABILITIES  
(people’s skill and capacities); and other 
characteristics of people (Culyer) 
Measured by functional specialisms, see e.g. 
various psychological and health indicators. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF GOODS, which are 
acquired through consumption. 
 
Not much researched by economics, except in 
some basic needs work. Investigated by functional 
specialisms, such as in nutrition, health, education, 
transport, fashion, and in psychology. 
CONSUMPTION proper 
– viz., actual use of purchases / acquisitions. 
Not much researched by economics, except in 
some basic needs work. Left to psychology, 
anthropology, medicine, cultural studies, etc. 
I. INFORMATION ON INPUTS; MONEY-METRIC FOCUS 
PURCHASES and other acquisitions 
More researched by marketing, psychology, 
anthropology, sociology; less intensively by 
economics. 
‘Utility’ as CHOICE, which is assumed to reflect 
preference, and (as the base case) is weighted 
according to purchasing power. 
These assumptions have been normal in 
economics; including ‘revealed preference’ as an 
axiom.
16
INCOME AND RESOURCES / POWER TO 
ACQUIRE GOODS/ COMMODITIES 
Researched by economics; not the power to 
acquire many other basic goods: political freedom, 
dignity, rewarding personal relations, satisfying 
meanings, … 
 
Partha Dasgupta calls the difference in focus here between economists and 
other relevant sciences ‘a cultural divide’ (2001: 33). He initially represents the 
groups involved too narrowly, identifying only philosophers, who he says examine 
                                                 
15 Note e.g. WHO’s categories of social, emotional and physical well-being. 
16 We saw that typically preferences have been imputed from real choices. Nowadays, stated 
preferences and notional choices are presumed in parts of economics to be reliable guides to real 
choices. 
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constituents of well-being, and economists and statisticians, who focus on its 
determinants. Absent at first from this colloquy on well-being are the rest of the social 
sciences and humanities. They provide richer perspectives on both the constituents 
and the determinants, and find that the connection between well-being and the means 
studied in economics is weak and not infrequently perverse. As we will see, Dasgupta 
later reaches out somewhat across this second disciplinary divide, a greater one than 
that between economists and many Anglo-American philosophers. Oswald (1997) 
adds that a gap has existed too between psychologists working on SWB and 
sociologists et al. working on non-self-report measures of QOL. 
Figure 3 uses the sequence of levels presented in figure 2, for exposition and 
comparison of the conceptions of well-being in a selection of recent work, with 
emphasis on lower-income countries. One point that arises concerns the insufficiency of 
the traditional economics conception; a second concerns the variety of alternative 
conceptions, which reflect partly different purposes and contexts. 
A major finding is the repeated confirmation that the realm of means which 
economics has focused on is often only weakly connected to the world of ends, of 
satisfaction, valued functioning, and fulfilment. For both SWB and OWB the main 
determinants seem often not to be the monetary ones on which economists have 
concentrated. Robert Lane calls the incoherence of the economics narrative of welfare 
‘the economistic fallacy’ (Lane 1991). This implies a need for alternative or additional 
base-narratives, with different variables to be highlighted in the bottom rows of figure 
3. 
While well-being is a plural category, some conceptualizations are perhaps 
better seen as part of a wider category of ‘advantage’. Sen has stressed that people 
often pursue goals which do not further their own well-being, in the traditional 
economics sense of their own comfort and convenience, but instead goals concerning 
other people or general ideals. (This is different from saying that they do things 
against their own benefit due to errors.) Some other authors say that the traditional 
economics sense is too narrow and that well-being covers such wider goals too. In any 
case, freedom to achieve well-being is different from achieved well-being. Freedom is 
one  conception  of personal advantage, but assessing freedom could be different from  
assessing well-being. Whether or not people prefer to be free to make their own 
mistakes, we perhaps should not define well-being as freedom. 
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Not all concepts of well-being also concern advantage, for the latter is a 
normative concept, whereas assessments of well-being can be for a variety of 
purposes. Some are simply descriptive, like the measures of SWB. Some are 
evaluative judgements of people’s state-of-being, according to particular normative 
conceptions of WB. Some are better seen as prescriptive, concerning how people 
should be treated: e.g. provided with opportunities even if it is expected that some 
people will make severe mistakes and blight their own well-being in the more usual 
sense. I have suggested that such concepts could in fact be seen instead as concepts of 
what is advantage, not well-being. Money-metric measures then concern opportunities 
(but only a narrow range of these: opportunities to purchase), not well-being in the 
more usual sense. So does Sen’s criterion of range of valued choice. 
Section 4 will use this framework to understand the conceptualizations of 
well-being by a number of leading recent contributors on human development, 
including some of those presented in figure 3: Partha Dasgupta, Amartya Sen, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Len Doyal & Ian Gough. 
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FIGURE 3 
Comparative overview of the focus and assumptions of selected writers on human development and well-being 
AUTHORS on  
WELL-BEING 
COUDOUEL et 
al.  BAULCH  KABEER  DASGUPTA  SEN  NUSSBAUM  DOYAL & GOUGH  DIENER  DECI & RYAN 
GENERAL NATURE 
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  255  SOME CURRENT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT THEORISTS 
5.1  Dasgupta on technically superior substitutes for GNP 
Partha Dasgupta proposes two measures as major advances over both GNP 
and the HDI. His measure for current well-being includes attention to liberties as well 
as to income, health and education. To measure the sustainable level of well-being he 
proposes a comprehensive measure of wealth. He calculates (2001, chapter 9) that in 
many low-income countries the rise in present well-being has been achieved by such 
degradation of natural assets that societal wealth, his measure of societal well-being 
over time, has fallen. 
Dasgupta argues as a contractarian that the state’s responsibility is not the 
management of happiness and the guarantee of achievement but instead the provision 
of opportunity, of preconditions for all to pursue their own purposes (1993: 53-5). 
Like other contract theories, this ignores the major cases of children and the mentally 
infirm. Given that WB is one of nearly everyone’s purposes, we also still need to 
understand and measure it and what promotes or facilitates it, and his An Inquiry into 
Well-Being and Destitution adopted this agenda. It originally views WB as 
‘flourishing’ (p. 34; and also uses the concept of of ‘a well-lived life’, p. 44), but 
deems the idea elusive, not well-captured by any of ‘happiness’, ‘pleasure’, 
‘satisfaction’ or ‘utility’. He proceeds though to a definition: ‘A person’s well-being is 
an aggregate of its constituents: utility (because it is the most reliable approximate of 
her rational desires), and an index of the worth to her of the freedoms she enjoys’ 
(1993: 70). He omits any independent value to functionings. In practice to him well-
being is largely a subjective category (being subject-specified or concerning feelings). 
He does not however try to then measure it directly (2001: 34 ff.) as psychologists do, 
but instead in the economists’ fashion via long chains of assumptions. 
His recent study of Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment (2001) 
includes now no preliminary Aristotelian flourish; the categories stay closer to his 
practice. For example he explicitly makes no distinction between WB and QOL 
(2001: xviii), unlike Sen. He adopts a flexible subjective concept of ‘welfare’, as the 
valuation by a person of her own situation. This potentially includes pleasure obtained 
from abuse of others. Thus ‘welfare’ should be traded-off sometimes against respect 
for others’ rights. Perhaps unfortunately, he uses ‘welfare’ and ‘utility’ 
interchangeably, but (p. 15) ‘well-being’ remains a wider notion which includes other 
concerns (‘non-welfare characteristics’), notably for human rights (but also health, 
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‘associational life, various kinds of freedoms to be and to do’, p. 22). Thus he 
recognizes that a drug-user’s valuation of his own situation could diverge from his 
well-being (p. 36), given ‘non-welfare’ concerns such as health, and also because the 
drug-user’s valuation is flawed. Dasgupta has held to the peculiar notion of ‘welfare’ 
which is traditional in economics, although etymologically welfare could arguably be 
a wider notion than well-being: ‘fare’ means to travel, travel through life, rather than 
only to be at a moment. 
He adopts in both books the assumptions of sum-ranking across persons and of 
comparability of all objectives. The assumptions may reflect a view that choices can 
only be made after aggregation of costs and benefits (e.g. 2001: 23), rather than 
sometimes by other procedures (e.g. lexicographic, or by voting). His version of 
current WB is thus a national measure that adds political and civil liberties to HDI-
type concerns, as the HDR 1991 tried; but unlike the HDRs he measures private 
consumption not GNP per capita and he synthesizes the concerns differently. 
Dasgupta notes briefly but dismissively sociologists’ work on measures of 
objective well-being (p. 36), but treats more favourably and uses at least some of 
psychologists’ work on measures of subjective well-being, consistent with his 
definition of individual ‘welfare’ in terms of self-valuation of situation. He uses first 
the finding that whereas at very low levels of material living subjective well-being is 
undoubtedly increased by material gains, in rich countries it is not. Commendably, he 
holds back from any further income-based claims on levels of well-being in rich 
countries (p. 38). Secondly, in both rich and poor countries, other things contribute to 
happiness. From the literature he emphasises health, employment and civic 
participation. He feels this supports his inclusion of indices of consumption, health 
(viz., life expectancy), and civic and political liberties in his well-being measures, and 
concludes that in poor countries they are adequate proxies for happiness (p. 38). The 
conclusion ignores many other determinants of happiness, such as employment 
(which he treats only as a badge of social status), and the distribution of consumption, 
and assumes that liberties are converted into participation. Yet he himself later notes, 
for example, that longevity is an insufficient measure of health status: ‘it isn’t difficult 
to remain alive even when malnourished and weak’ (p. 79); and complains of the 
neglect of measures of nutrition in assessing the quality of growth (fn. 42). 
Dasgupta’s index of current well-being significantly diverges in many 
important cases from GNP per capita, notably in the most unequal cases (2001: 62). 
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So too does the HDI, but he attacks this; first for being ad hoc, and second for not 
showing the decline in longterm prospects due to ‘mining’ of natural capital, as shown 
by his own index of well-being over time. The HDI does not of course claim to be a 
measure of wealth or of well-being over time, and we need measures of present well-
being precisely in order to then see the trade-offs over time. The role of the HDI 
should instead be seen as tactical and political – to reach an audience of politicians, 
administrators and the wider public, in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of GDP - 
and it has succeeded in that. To fulfil the role it had to be easily understandable and 
universally calculable, hence its simple and ‘ad hoc’ nature. Its constructors were 
aware of its limitations.
17 The wider UNDP Human Development approach explicitly 
highlights other relevant dimensions of present well-being, including distribution, 
employment, civic and political liberties, and their use, including security, and more. 
Concluding that there is no adequate single synthesis, the Human Development Reports 
amongst others mainly use a disaggregated approach. 
Having delegitimated GDP as a well-being measure, various paths lie open. 
One is to construct better composite indicators, the path trodden by Dasgupta. What 
their additional value-added is, for whom and what, needs to be considered. Would 
they be used to allocate, say, international aid? One doubts it. Another path is to 
accept that no composite indicator is very good, and to consider how to intelligently 
handle plurality and incommensurabilities, with an eye to the variety of contexts and 
purposes. There is not as much depth in Dasgupta’s discussion of the notion of WB as 
in his disturbing examination of our exploitation of and impacts on the natural 
environment, and in his case for appropriate measures of wealth as measures of 
sustainable WB. Those merits of his discussion no doubt survive his limited 
conceptualization of WB. Let us proceed to others who investigate the concept of WB 
further. 
                                                 
17 UNDP’s retention of GDP per capita was arguably a mistake (though not unique to them – see 
Dasgupta 1993); private consumption per capita is logically more appropriate. But tactically, for 
recognition and acceptance, and logistically, for worldwide computability, GDP per capita was a more 
suitable component. 
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5.2  Sen: a conceptual backdrop to analyse personal advantage and quality of 
life 
Various great economists, like Mill, Marshall and Pigou, had ethical visions 
which had little longterm impact in economics since they remained as non-integrated, 
non-formalized supplements to their economic theories (Ackerman 1997). In contrast 
Sen has got major ethical messages relatively far into his discipline. He has built an 
alternative that is influential in theory, applied research and policy. 
Analytically, he has critiqued the conflation in modern welfare economics of 
numerous categories (self-interest = preference = choice = satisfaction = WB) which 
has been exacerbated by giving several of them the name utility. He has pluralized our 
conceptual armoury to discuss ‘human advantage’, as we noted earlier and will 
elaborate. He recognizes for example how satisfaction can come both from one’s own 
situation and from others’ situations. At the same time, he stresses that interpretations 
of ambiguous ideas ‘must try to capture that ambiguity rather than hide or eliminate 
it’ (1993: 34). 
Normatively, he has argued convincingly that many types of information are 
relevant to the assessment of WB and QOL, and has warned against focus on hedonic 
well-being alone. As we saw in section 2, he argues for a focus on some specific 
functionings and, especially, capabilities, more than on satisfaction; and he in effect 
adopts an analogue to the ‘informed desire’ or, better, ‘reasoned desire’ conception in 
this different space for evaluation: namely a priority to those capabilities (and 
functionings) which we ‘have reason to value’. While he shares the eudaimonic 
conception’s concern for valued functionings, he stresses in a policy context the 
capability to attain these functionings above the actual attainment; and he eschews a 
general statement of what are priority functionings, leaving the prioritization to 
legitimate decision procedures in each situation. 
My purpose here is to elucidate rather than assess Sen’s conceptualization of 
well-being. (For more on assessment, see e.g. Giri 2000; Gasper 2002; Gasper & van 
Staveren 2003). Let us look at his usage of the term ‘well-being’, and at whether 
capability is better seen as an interpretation of a person’s ‘advantage’. 
Is Sen’s capability approach really a theory of WB? 
Sen’s capability approach does not centre on the content of being – specific 
functionings – nor on functionings as primary evaluative criterion. It gives priority in 
evaluation to capability (e.g., ‘quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to 
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achieve valuable functionings’, 1993: 31), though it retains a secondary evaluative role 
for functionings (e.g., 1993: 32 ‘sees the evaluative space in terms of functionings and 
capabilities to function’). Capability seems best read then as a freedom-centred concern 
relevant in policy prescription, an appropriate concept of advantage rather than of 
achieved well-being or quality of life. Indeed Sen writes of ‘The capability approach to 
a person’s advantage …’ (though also, a few lines earlier, of ‘a particular approach to 
well-being and advantage’, 1993: 30).
18
Is Sen’s usage of the term ‘well-being’ still too utilitarian? 
Sen formalizes various choices in assessing a person’s advantage. Two are: reference 
to opportunities or to achievements; and assessment in terms of a person’s own costs 
and benefits, or in terms of the person’s values which could ignore aspects of their 
own welfare and include concerns about other matters. ‘Assessment in terms of a 
person’s own costs and benefits’ itself includes two cases: first, where we refer to 
satisfactions, which can be affected by other person’s situations (via sympathy or 
Schadenfreude); and second, where we refer only to those aspects of a person’s well-
being determined by ‘the nature of his own life, rather than from “other-regarding” 
objectives or impersonal concerns’ (Sen 1993: 37).
19 Sen describes the second as 
theperson’s ‘Standard of Living’ (a label that only makes sense coming out of the 
economics tradition). He thus generates five categories for describing and assessing a 
person’s situation, shown in figure 4. And he then adds a sixth, quality of life. 
In understanding an ambiguous idea Sen tries to reveal the ambiguity. Are all 
the five categories faces of well-being; or only the ‘well-being’ column; or only the 
shaded cell whereas other cells represent other aspects of a person’s ‘advantage’; or 
even WBA only, since that is about being, not just potential, and about the 
individual’s being, not other people’s, but inclusive of what she feels about others ? 
He  seems  to  conclude  that  all  are  relevant aspects, with their relevance depending 
                                                 
18 Sen’s Nobel lecture (2002: 82-5) speaks alternately of (inter-personal comparisons of) personal well-
being, personal welfare, and individual advantage, though without equating them; p. 94 differentiates 
between well-being and overall advantage. Alkire (2002) too moves to and fro between these names. 
19 In contrast Hammond rules out reference to preferences concerning other people, as being intrusive. 
He tries to construct a category of ‘an individual’s personal welfare’ which excludes such preferences 
(p.108). It is different from Sen’s ‘Own WB’, since that includes sympathy effects, let alone from QOL 
in Sen’s schema. He uses the term ‘meddlesome preferences’ but his move rules out Sen’s ‘sympathy’ 
and ‘commitment’ and excludes all feelings and concern for others. In fact both markets and politics 
allow expression of preferences regarding others; and the ‘external effects’ of other people’s situation 
on a person’s well-being or QOL are standard, not rare. 
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upon the context; but his choice of terms prioritizes the well-being column. His sixth 
term, ‘quality of life’, could fit the agency column or represent an evaluative 
summing-up of AA and WBA, or of the whole table. 
FIGURE 4 
Sen’s categories for ranking a person’s situation 
  In terms of an agent’s 
personal/own well-being 
In terms of the agent’s 
objectives 
Actual achievement 
(Own) Well-Being Achievement 
(WBA); 
 
'Standard of Living' (SOL) 
= WBA minus 'sympathy' 
Agency Achievement 
(AA) 





Sen reserved the label well-being for the categories in the first column. Within 
that column we can interpret well-being in terms of pleasure, or of reasoned desire, or 
of externally specified valued functionings (e.g. life-span, etc., as in QOL research); 
but in all cases for self-referential concerns only (including, except in SOL, the 
pleasures from the benefit of others whom one cares for, and from the sufferings of 
one’s enemies). Sen himself does not present an externally specified list, but in 
practice uses an implicit partial list in his examples and his policy-oriented work. He 
continually refers to certain good functionings (such as longevity, health, and self-
respect) in order to criticize assessments of well-being instead in the spaces of 
income, commodities, or felt utility. But he also gives space for well-being in terms of 
pleasure/satisfaction (hence the issue about whether or not to include pleasures caused 
by other’s situations). Arguably his linguistic privileging of the first column is 
consistent with still seeing well-being (in his terms) as preference fulfilment, but that 
conception fits more readily his agency column, since many preferences are about 
other people and other types of concern, and the ‘utility’ imputed from choices would 
reflect this. 
Some people advocate ‘agency achievement’ as the best single candidate for 
the title ‘well-being’: the fulfilment of one’s goals, whatever their subject. This 
matches a less self-enclosed conception of personhood, and a less utilitarian 
conception of satisfaction. For Sen, WB is self-referential; agency is anything-
referential. This is one standard usage, the idea of WB as ‘prudential value’: ‘the 
notion of how well a person’s life is going for that person’ (Crisp: section 1). It 
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encounters criticism from various authors (e.g. Gore 1997, Giri 2000, Nussbaum 
2000). First, it rests on assumptions about sharp bounds of the self. Second, Sen uses 
the category of ‘commitment’ to cover the pursuit of objectives which bring the agent 
no utility, in contrast to the pleasures of ‘sympathy’. ‘Commitment’ thus falls outside 
‘well-being’, perhaps reflecting a utilitarian assumption that there is only one 
currency of feeling (‘utility’). Third, the debatable contrast between being and agency 
might lead to a further separation in Sen’s vocabulary, between being and living (WB 
versus QOL). 
Sen’s main focus has however been on the last row in figure 4: on the lives 
that people could attain, with reference to those functionings that people ‘have reason 
to value’. He concentrates on well-reasoned desires (for him ‘reason’ implies 
reasoning, not mere whim or habit) and on the capabilities space, not directly the 
functionings space (except for proxy purposes, or with secondary status), let alone the 
commodities space. He emphasises the contrast between rows in figure 4, and chose 
to describe his approach as ‘the capability approach’. 
To some people the contrast between columns seems more important. It starts 
to add a theory of personhood. Over time, Sen has come to stress the language of 
‘freedom’ above that of capability, perhaps partly because it links to this contrast 
between columns too. People can and do freely commit themselves to things other 
than their own narrowly-defined well-being. What he calls the process-aspect of 
freedom (e.g. 1999: 291) refers to people’s sharing in choices, on the basis of their 
various values and objectives. The opportunity-aspect of freedom concerns the extent 
of people’s capability set. 
It may be wise to adopt different labels, and to break from the welfare 













ACHIEVEMENT Objective  well-being Gratification /  
Subjective well-being 
Goal achievement 
POTENTIAL/FREEDOM  OWB potential  SWB potential  Potential for goal 
achievement 
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points to the need for an alternative vocabulary in which the term well-being no 
longer has singular reference but functions at most as the ambiguous umbrella for a 
complex field. 
 
5.3  The roles of lists: Nussbaum, Doyal & Gough, Alkire 
Nussbaum: a richer exploration of human well-being, for backing human 
rights. 
Martha Nussbaum provides an objective-list conception of well-being, plus in a policy 
context a liberal focus on the capabilities to achieve those functionings highlighted in 
the list. In the Aristotelian tradition, pride of place is given to practical reason and to 
affiliation with others. Nussbaum’s list in various versions has attracted great 
attention. Rather than repeat the details of the list or the discussion around it (see e.g. 
Nussbaum 2000, Alkire 2002, Gasper 2003), let us situate her work.
20
Although her list contrives to keep in general a Mosaic length of ten (with sub-
parts), it is not ad hoc. It is derived first through Aristotelian procedures. Her criteria 
for the ‘well’ in well-being arise as criteria for what is human, and, more extensively, 
for what are capabilities essential to live at a minimum decent level: ‘with dignity’. 
These hypotheses then cross-checked with a variety of sources and interlocutors, 
including from diverse cultures and literatures on well-being. The list yet lacks the 
degree of theorized order found in for example Doyal & Gough’s model with its 
rigorous distinctions between levels, which influenced figure 3. Why does it still 
deservedly draw attention? 
First, it consciously builds a basis for core rights, as parts of a legal 
constitution, to give a set of entrenched priorities without which we would leave too 
much open to domination by the powerful. It is best seen as conveying a method of 
thinking for developing such a priority set. A key audience consists of legislators, 
lawyers and judges, and those who seek to influence them. Second, it buttresses Sen’s 
move to increase the range of types of information used in evaluation, for it provides a 
substantive language to express people’s multi-faceted concerns (Nussbaum 2000: 
138-9). Third, using such language helps to open up observers’ perceptions of the 
                                                 
20 It is important to refer to her work published from 1999 onwards, which significantly revises and 
refines her theory, and no longer to the widely read predecessor papers. 
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content of others’ lives and their own, and contributes to building sympathy and 
commitment (Gasper 2003). 
Doyal & Gough’s synthesis for discussing policy priorities. 
Existentialist work on well-being attacks perspectives like the Aristotelian which 
derive an extensive picture of well-being from a relatively full picture of human 
nature. It uses a different and less extensive picture, asserting that self-determination 
is ‘the defining characteristic of what it is to be human’ (Hodge 1990: 43). The 
meaning of well-being is for people themselves to determine. Thus existentialists 
dispute objective list approaches, as in QOL research. For them what matters is self-
determination, and all other aspects are not given as good or bad by human nature but 
depend on mental attitude. However we should not equate choice with self-
determination; addiction must be distinguished from autonomy. And the criteria of 
autonomy and self-determination have limited application also to the very young, the 
very old and the mentally infirm. 
The work of Doyal & Gough is important, first for seeking to draw out an 
objective list of implications of a commitment to autonomy, and second for 
integrating many of the elements found in Sen, Nussbaum, QOL research (notably on 
physical and mental health), the existentialists and others. By a layered conception of 
well-being’s aspects and determinants, similar to that in section 3 above, and by 
systematically studying the links between levels, Doyal & Gough bridge the ‘cultural 
divide’ described by Dasgupta and Kabeer, and integrate the discussion of means and 
ends, establishing agendas for measurement and institutionalization at the various 
levels (Gasper 1996). Gough’s work in the Bath project on Well-being in Developing 
Countries continues in this direction (Clark & Gough 2003), by connecting to the 
Resource Profiles approach to livelihoods (Kebede & McGregor 2003) and to SWB 
research (Camfield & Skevington 2003). 
Doyal & Gough ask what are the prerequisites for avoiding serious harm and 
for functioning as an effective member of one’s society. These are their criteria for 
basic needs. By focusing on the requirements of functioning as a society member, 
they are close to a social exclusion perspective. They argue that autonomy of agency, 
plus physical and mental health, are the minimum prerequisites. More striking than 
the specific inclusions in this list of posited basic needs – Nussbaum, existentialists 
and desire-fulfilment theories also prioritize goal formation and pursuit, though as 
directly central to human being – is the exclusion of other things from this level of 
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priority, as a result of constructing their needs list by using explicit criteria, not ad 
hoc. The same principles of systematic derivation are applied down the hierarchy of 
levels which we saw in section 3, rather than declaring needs/priorities by intuition. 
Given the layered structure of the model, moving from general ideals down through 
levels of increasingly specific means, it generates not a single list but lists at each 
level. 
This is an ethical theory not a psychological theory, although it uses 
psychological evidence. It is a theory about needs as posited high priorities for policy; 
not a theory about motives, nor about every normative concern. Still, psychological 
evidence on what people care about is certainly relevant, and Camfield & Skevington 
report that the focus on autonomy matches the findings of decades of psychological 
research. 
Bowlby’s Attachment Theory holds that relatedness is a key condition for 
building autonomy: a person will operate more effectively when he feels he has a 
‘secure base’ of other persons on whom he can rely for support if and when needed 
(Downes 1990). This finding emerged also in eudaimonic WB research. Thus Ryan & 
Deci (2001) highlight, besides autonomy and competence, relatedness as a key 
determinant of felt well-being; and Nussbaum highlights affiliation as the second key 
capability. Doyal & Gough’s theory could readily absorb an additional posited basic 
need such as affiliation/relatedness/ conviviality, and draw out its implications. The 
theory offers space for partly different specifications of derived need according to 
what are the specified desirable functionings. 
Alkire’s synthesis for project management. 
Focused at a different operational level – not the national (and even global) 
constitution-making of Nussbaum or the policy-design level of Doyal & Gough, but 
rather at a local or project planning level – Alkire argues that a list of core aspects of 
well-being serves as a tool to give structure to, rather than replace, processes of 
discussion in particular situations (2002: 38). A list is an aid, to avoid forgetting 
matters which are often found important. For fuller ideas on how to structure such 
processes, Alkire uses the work of an Australian philosopher, John Finnis. Finnis 
seeks to identify basic reasons for action: reasons for which no other reason has to be 
given in order to be intelligible. He and collaborators have generated their own such 
list, in various versions. Interestingly, providing happiness is absent, perhaps 
considered as too undifferentiated; our reasons are not reducible to one. To judge such 
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intelligible motives and their fulfilment to be good or bad is declared to involve a 
further step. However, also absent from the list are, for example, competitive spirit, 
aggression, and malice; so the list may be already more moralized than it claims.
21
The list of motives is used as the set of dimensions to be covered in local 
discussions about evaluating past or prospective changes, as the hypothesized 
dimensions of human well-being. Alkire shows how, without necessarily measuring 
well-being directly, a deeply considered and enriched conception of well-being (with 
again an emphasis on capability) can guide local planning and resource allocation. 
What she finds she needs in order to operationalize Sen are the methods of Nussbaum  
and Finnis (Alkire, pp. 224-6): a ‘thick’ (multi-dimensional), ‘vague’ (stated generally 
and requiring local interpretation) conception of the good, applied through a process 
of practical reasoning. This leads us to a successor of the basic human needs approach 
(pp. 168, 173) and to multi-criteria analyses, including some in aggregating mode and 




6  CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD WE TRY TO MEASURE? 
Too much work on well-being has been based on insufficient evidence and 
theory about be-ing. Many economists and philosophers apparently expected to 
establish appropriate concepts of well-being from reflection that abstracts from 
evidence and not only from particulars. They mistook the role of theory, which is to 
make sense of evidence; concepts should reflect plentiful experience rather than 
screen it out. In economics the treatment of well-being has been too much an offshoot 
of market calculation, with attempts to modify market figures of willingness-to-pay in 
order to make them acceptable well-being estimates. The study of use-values has 
needed to break from the tyranny of categories derived from the study of exchange-
values. In contrast, work in psychology, sociology, and socio-economics (e.g. Etzioni 
1988) has generated concepts more adequately grounded in experience. Hence this 
paper on concepts started with some of the evidence and has tried throughout to relate 
conceptualization to evidence. 
                                                 
21 In contrast, Jeremy Bentham’s Table of the Springs of Action included such factors (Collard 2003). 
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I draw the following ideas from the evidence. There are many major aspects of 
‘objective’ well-being (such as health, family life, employment, recreation, quality of 
death), and these are also major determinants of subjective well-being. These aspects 
are far from invariably strongly positively correlated with access to commodities via 
income, so that income cannot act as proxy for the others. Indeed, the aspects can 
sometimes be negatively correlated with income and each other, so that to use income, 
or any other variable, as proxy for all the others can be seriously misleading. One 
possible explanation for the Easterlin paradox, besides concerns with status and 
relative position, and the emergence of new aspirations, is this: even if higher income 
would, other things being equal, raise SWB, the generation of the income might have 
substantial negative side effects on major determinants of SWB like family life; the 
‘other things’ don’t remain equal, under many arrangements. We need disaggregated 
pictures which highlight various aspects of life. In looking at information on persons 
we must study good outlier cases too, as the ‘positive psychology’ movement does, 
and not rest content with the measures of central tendency and crude macro 
correlations. 
Of course we sometimes have good reason to aggregate; not because this 
reveals a shared essence such as utility, but because we need to make choices, and this 
is one way. The HDI too had a good reason to aggregate, for its rationale was to 
provide a contrast to the ruling aggregate, GNP; to suggest how it misleads us on 
welfare, not to claim that it was itself a great indicator of overall welfare. Aggregation 
is unlikely to ever give a great overall indicator here; any appropriate weights might 
be far from fixed, for example. 
The other theme that emerged was that numerous different concepts and 
measures are required to match the various contexts and purposes. For example, in 
distributing international aid between countries, one would probably not adjust (or 
supplement) national income figures for the quality of family life; whereas for 
assessing QOL and explaining social dynamics one might do so. Dasgupta (2001: 31-
2) points out that different organizational contexts generate differences in purpose: 
responsibilities need to be divided, and the different institutions need to pursue 
different objectives, and hence to measure different things. 
Amongst the authors we discussed, Dasgupta appeared focused on providing a 
more robust alternative to GNP as an aggregate measure of WB, not just to 
delegitimate it as the HDI had done. Such an aggregate measure which makes 
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normative claims remains in demand for some purposes. Sen’s purposes have been 
different: to delegitimate GNP as a WB measure, as prelude to opening us to the use 
of diverse types of information which feed into various types of decisionmaking. 
Alkire’s work on project planning and evaluationn exemplifies this. Max-Neef too is 
oriented to project action and the workshop format, not to technocratic measurement. 
Nussbaum is less oriented to measurement of WB, more to the design of constitutions. 
Operationalization includes institutionalization, not only measurement. 
Not everything important needs to be measured; thus informed-desire theory 
carries many policy implications even if we could not come up with an informed-
desire measure of WB. And many of the important things to be measured are 
determinants of WB, inputs rather than outputs. For example, we can attempt to 
measure what Sen calls sympathy and commitment, as vital societal glue, types of 
‘social capital’; but attempts to monetize say empowerment would seem misguided 
(Alkire 2002: 209). 
We must address well-being not only by measurement but also, and sometimes 
instead, by for example rich qualitative description. The methods of conventional 
economics are insufficient to capture and communicate all of importance that is 
involved. We need in addition cases of particular real people in their complexity, in 
their social and historical contexts. Testimony, ‘voices of the poor’, life histories, and 
the languages of feelings are indispensable complements to economists’ abstraction 
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